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Jay ~ar l i s le*  
During the 1999-2000 survey year the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit has issued at least twenty-five res 
judicata decisions' expanding the doctrines of claim preclusion2 and 
issue preclusion. The court liberally applied claim preclusion but 
infrequently applied the more expansive doctrine of issue preclusion.3 
Also, the Second Circuit released over fifty unpublished decisions4 that 
affect the rights of pro se litigants appearing before the court.5 These 
decisions demonstrate the court's immense respect for the doctrine of 
res judicata. Similarly, the decisions illustrate the extent to which the 
* Professor of Law, Pace University Law School; Editor, Second Circuit Digest, 
1990- 1994. 
1. See infra notes 19-20, 30, 39, 41, 43, 46-49, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63-64, 66, 69-70 
and accompanying text. 
2. Claim preclusion is sometimes referred to as res judicata. Claim preclusion 
has been defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as 
follows: After a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, res judicata bars subsequent litigation between the same parties and those 
in privity with them involving the same cause of action. See Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. 
Hessen (In re Teltronics Servs., Inc.), 762 F.2d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 1985). "If subsequent 
litigation arises from the same cause of action, both those matters actually offered to 
sustain the claim and those that might have been offered in the prior action are barred 
from being relitigated; that is, there is claim preclusion." Rezzonico v. H. & R. Block, 
Inc., 182 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1999). 
3. Issue preclusion is sometimes referred to as collateral estoppel. The Second 
Circuit has defined issue preclusion as follows: 
If subsequent litigation arises from a different cause of action, the prior 
judgment bars only those matters or issues common to both actions that were 
expressly or by necessary implication adjudicated in the prior litigation. This 
prong of res judicata is referred to as issue preclusion. The Supreme Court 
has stated that issue preclusion means that when an issue has been determined 
by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the 
same parties in any future lawsuit. 
Rezzonico, 182 F.3d at 148 (quoting Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222,232 (1994)). 
4. See infra note 70. 
5. The majority of these law suits are civil rights (42 U.S.C. 5 1983) and Title VII 
litigation involving allegations of discrimination and unlawful termination of 
employment. 
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court relies on the doctrine to achieve finality, to prevent inconsistent 
judgments and to allocate judicial  resource^.^ This survey article will 
review some of the court's significant decisions and comment on future 
trends for application of the law of res judicata in the Second Circuit. 
In its broadest sense, the term res judicata has been used by the 
Second Circuit to refer to a variety of concepts dealing with the 
preclusive effects of a judgment on subsequent litigation.' Claim 
preclusion is the doctrine that once a claim is brought to a final 
conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series 
of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if 
seeking a different remedy.' Issue preclusion basically precludes a party 
from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly 
raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or 
those in privity, whether the tribunals or causes of action are the same.9 
Its typical application occurs when one of the parties to a civil action 
argues that preclusive effect should be given to one or more issues 
determined in an earlier civil action between the same parties in the 
same jurisdiction.I0 The United States Supreme Court has explained the 
6. See Jay Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine of 
Issue Preclusion Make an Administrative or  Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court 
of law?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 63,84-94 (1986). 
7. Leather v. Ten Eyck, 180 F.3d 420,423 (2d Cir. 1999). 
8. L-Tec Elecs. Corp. v. Cougar Elec. Org., Inc., 198 F.3d 85, 87-88 (2d Cir. 
1999) ("The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents a plaintiff from 
relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in a prior action against the same 
defendant where that action has reached a final judgment on the merits."). 
9. Johnson v. Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels A.G., 198 F.3d 342, 346-47 
(2d Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit points out that the doctrine of collateral estoppel or 
issue preclusion bars the relitigation of issues actually litigated and decided in the prior 
proceeding as long as that determination was essential to that judgment. The court 
states that the 
[alpplication of .  . . collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is central to the 
purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution 
of disputes within their jurisdictions. To preclude parties from contesting 
matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their 
adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, 
conserves judicial resources, and foster reliance on judicial action by 
minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions. 
Id. (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979)). 
10. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979) (quoting B. 
MOORE, J.D., LUCAS & T.S. CURRIER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 0.405(1), 622-24 (2d ed. 
1974)). See generally Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (setting forth 
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difference between claim preclusion and issue preclusion in Parklane 
Hosiery Co. v. Shore: I I 
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars 
a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same 
cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, 
the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the 
prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the 
12 
outcome of the first action. 
The concepts of claim preclusion and issue preclusion are from the 
common lawI3 but each doctrine has a different origin. Claim preclusion 
is a Roman law concept while issue preclusion originated in Germanic 
law.I4 The policies supporting these doctrines include many of society's 
desires: to promote fairness;" to prevent inconsistent judgments and to 
achieve uniformity and certainty;'ho finalize disputes among the 
parties;'' and to conserve judicial resources.I8 These policy concerns 
underlie each of the Second Circuit's res judicata decisions during the 
survey year. 
the modem formulation of issue preclusion); Cromwell v. County of Sacramento, 94 
U.S. 351, 352-55 (1876) (setting forth fundamental historical differences between claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion). 
11. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). 
12. Id. at 326. 
13. See Carlisle, supra note 6, at 66. 
14. See generally Robert Wyners Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel By 
Record to Res Judicata, 35 ILL. L. REV. 41, 41-42 (1940) (translating Seelman, Der 
Rechtszug im alteren deutschen Recht, 107 Gierkes Untersuchungen zur deutschen 
Staats-und Rechtsgenchichte 90, 103, 198-99 (191 I)). 
15. Concepts of fair play and due process have consistently been important policy 
considerations for district courts in the Second Circuit and for the circuit when 
considering issue preclusion. S.E.C. v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 303-04 
(2d Cir. 1999). 
16. See id. See also Brainerd Cunie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of 
the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281,289 (1957). 
17. See Monarch, 192 F.3d at 303-04. 
18. See Leather v. Ten Eyck, 180 F.3d 420,424-25 (1999). 
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A. Doctrine Applied 
Two key survey year decisions applying the doctrine of claim 
preclusion are El Bohio Public Development Corp. v. ~ i u l i a n i ' ~  and 
Waldman v. Village of Kiryas ~oel ." In Waldman, the circuit court, 
speaking through Judge Guido Calabresi, affirmed the judgment of the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
dismissing Waldman's civil rights suit against the village of Kiryas Joel 
and its officials. The suit sought to dissolve the village because its 
existence and operation as a theocracy violated the establishment clause 
of the United States Constitution. The district court, by Judge 
Bamngton D. Parker, Jr., dismissed the action on res judicata (claim 
preclusion) grounds." The court reasoned that Waldman had previously 
litigated many of the alleged facts and claims in an earlier action against 
the same defendants." The district court held that "because this claim 
'arise[s] out of the same nucleus of operative facts' as the earlier suit 
and should have been brought together with the prior action, Waldman 
is currently barred from seeking the relief he now requests."*' 
Judge Calabresi explained, "Res judicata . . . makes a final, valid 
judgment conclusive on the parties, and those in privity with them, as to 
all matters, fact and law, [that] were or should have been adjudicated in 
the pr~ceeding."'~ He noted that Waldman should have brought his 
claim for the dissolution of the village as part of the prior actions. 
Waldman argued that the current suit did not share a common nucleus 
of operative facts with the prior one, and that it would have been 
premature to have requested the dissolution of the village in the earlier 
action because the facts upon which that claim could have been based 
did not exist at that time." In rejecting these arguments, Judge 
19. 208 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000). 
20. 207 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2000). 
21. The United States District Court concluded that Waldman's suit against 
defendants-appellees, the Village and its officials, was barred by claim preclusion as a 
result of a prior suit against the Village in which Waldman was a named plaintiff. 
Waldman v. Vill. of Kiryas Joel, 39 F. Supp. 2d 370, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
22. Id. at 377. 
23. Waldman, 207 F.3d at 107. 
24. Id. at 108. 
25. Id. at 112. 
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Calabresi identified three indicia as being crucial to a determination of 
what constitutes a common nucleus of operative facts. First, the court 
must look to whether the underlying facts are related in time, space, 
origin, or motivation. Second, the court must also consider whether 
these facts form a convenient trial unit. Third, whether treatment as a 
unit conforms to the parties' expectations should be considered. 
Searching the records for the prior and current actions, he concluded all 
three indicia had been satisfied. Judge Calabresi also rejected 
Waldman's "new facts" argument. He stated, "It is true that res 
judicata will not bar a suit based upon legally significant acts occurring 
after the filing of a prior suit that was itself based upon earlier acts."26 
However, he concluded that Waldman's references to "new facts" were 
"nothing more than additional instances of what was previously 
a~serted."~' Finally, Judge Calabresi noted Waldman could not use "the 
mere inclusion of a few post Waldman I Village acts, themselves 
satisfactorily remediable through appropriately tailored relief, to 
resurrect a claim, grounded almost entirely upon pre-1997 events 
,928 
. . . .  
The Second Circuit's decision in Waldman extends the "might 
have been litigated" aspect of claim preclusion. It dismisses claims the 
court recognizes as having an independent basis for being heard in the 
district court and suggests the circuit is encouraging district court judges 
to more expansively apply the doctrine of claim prec lu~ ion .~~  
In El Bohio Public Development Corp., the circuit court affirmed 
the district court's3' grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of 
New York and two city officials dismissing El Bohio's challenge to the 
26. Id.at 113. 
27. Waldman, 207 F.3d at 113. 
28. Id. at 1 14. 
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 5 24 (1982). See also L-Tec 
Elecs. Corp. v. Cougar Elec. Org., Inc., 198 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1999). The 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments "might have been" or "could have been" litigated 
requirements for claim preclusion should be applied in a practical and pragmatic 
manner. Anything arguably "might have been" litigated but the circuit court's 
expansive application of this "same transaction" requirement is frequently unfair. See 
generally FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 14.4 (3d ed. 1999). 
30. El Bohio Pub. Dev. Corp. v. Guiliani, No. 99-7829, 2000 WL 326406 (2d Cir. 
Mar. 28,2000). Judge Michael Mukasey had noted that El Bohio's opposition presented 
various facts outside the pleadings and converted defendant's motion to dismiss, under 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, into a summary judgment motion 
and granted it, holding that plaintiffs had embellished their claims with later events that 
were previously known or should have been known to them. Id. 
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City's sale of certain property.31 The district court had dismissed El 
Bohio's action on the ground that it was barred by res judicata (claim 
preclusion) due to a previous suit instituted in the courts of the State of 
New York by El Bohio, presenting a pre-sale challenge to the same 
tran~action.~' The district court, by Judge Michael Mukasey, stressed 
that the "plaintiffs have embellished their present claim with later events 
. . . [blut the gravamen of their claim would have to be proved . . . out of 
the same skein of known facts underlying the initial The circuit 
court's affirmance of Judge Mukasey relied on Kremer v. Chemical 
34 Construction Corp., wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that when 
applying claim preclusion the Second Circuit must afford the same 
preclusive effect that the New York state courts give to their own 
judgments.35 Also, the circuit court cited O'Brien v. City of ~ ~ r a c u s e ~ ~  
for the proposition that the right to relitigate does not arise from later 
Several other circuit court opinions, applying the doctrine of claim 
preclusion, merit attention. In Skeete v. Pathmark Stores, ~ n c . , ~ ~  the 
circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs Title VII 
action on the grounds that claims previously litigated in New York state 
court could not be relitigated in a federal court.39 In United States v. 
~ l a h e r t ~ , "  the circuit court affirmed the district court's dismissal of 
31. Id. 
32. The New York State Supreme Court rejected El Bohio's challenge to the 
proposed sale, granted summary judgment to the City, and held that the City's actions 
were within the conditions established for the property's use by the Board of Estimate. 
The Appellate Division denied El Bohio's appeal in a short opinion on October 13, 
1998. El Bohio Pub. Dev. Corp. v. Diamond, 711 N.E.2d 201 (N.Y. 1998). The New 
York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, thus bringing to a close El Bohio's state- 
court challenge to the property's sale. 
33. El Bohio, 2000 WL 326406, at *2 (citing Smith v. Russell Sage Coll., 54 
N.Y.2d 185, 194,429 N.E.2d 746, 749 (1981)) (alteration in original). 
34. 456 U.S. 461 (1982). 
35. Id. at 466, 482-83 n.4; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, 9 1; 28 U.S.C. 9 1738 
(2000). 
36. 54 N.Y.2d 353,429 N.E.2d 1158 (1981). 
37. The circuit court expressly relied on the language of the New York Court of 
Appeals in Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 28, 379 N.E.2d 172, 175 (1978) 
("Afterthoughts or after discoveries however understandable and morally forgivable are 
generally not enough to create a right to litigate anew."). 
38. No. 98-9399, 1999 WL 447634 (2d Cir. June 16, 1999). 
39. Id. at *12 ("Having reviewed the record, we agree with the district court that 
Skeete received a full and fair adjudication of his employment discrimination claims in 
state court. Accordingly, he cannot now relitigate those claims in a federal forum."). 
40. No. 97-6295, 1999 WL 66153 (2d Cir. Feb. 10, 1999). 
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defendant's counterclaims on claim preclusion  ground^.^' In Ciuffetelli 
v. Apple Bank For ~ a v i n ~ s , ~ ~  the circuit court affirmed the district 
court's dismissal of plaintiffs negligence actions on claim preclusion 
grounds.43 The court stated that "[p]laintiffs' assertion that the majority 
of the acts complained of occurred after the execution of the agreement 
does not save their negligence claim."" The court explained that the 
plaintiffs presented no evidence to support a finding that their claims 
were meritorious. Finally, on December 29, 1999, the circuit court 
issued its last res judicata decision of the twentieth century.45 In Farrell 
v. ~ a t a k i , ~ ~  the circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a pro se 
civil rights action on the grounds of claim preclusion. Farrell, a 
disbarred attorney, filed his first pro se complaint in the southern district 
on March 19, 1997, alleging that New York state disciplinary bodies on 
two occasions refused to investigate his misconduct charges against 
judges and members of disciplinary committees, thereby violating a 
number of his constitutional rights. The district court, by Judge 
Deborah Batts, dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) there 
was no basis for the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over the 
underlying suit, (2) the defendants were immune from suit, and (3) no 
meritorious issues were stated in the complaint. In a second action, 
filed on November 2, 1998, Farrell named the same parties as 
defendants and relied upon facts substantially identical to those fully 
litigated and adjudicated on the merits in the proceeding before Judge 
41. Id. Counterclaims that could have been raised as direct or counterclaims in a 
prior action may arise out of the same transaction and occurrence. They will be barred 
either under Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (compulsory 
counterclaim) or under principles of res judicata or defensive claim preclusion. 
42. No. 99-7741,2000 WL 340388 (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 2000). 
43. On or about March 22, 1995, Apple commenced a foreclosure action against a 
number of properties owned by the plaintiff. On June 30, 1995, the parties agreed to 
sign an agreement disposing of the foreclosure action. Plaintiffs then filed an action 
against Apple and other named defendants. The district court ordered the dismissal of 
plaintiffs negligence claim, holding that the allegations with respect to all acts 
occuning before the June 30, 1995, agreement were subject to the agreement and thus 
barred by claim preclusion. The doctrine was not applicable to allegedly negligent 
actions occuning after the execution of the agreement. 
44. Ciuffetelli, 2000 WL 340388, at *2. 
45. See Farrell v. Pataki, 205 F.3d 1322 (2d Cir. 1999), which was an appeal from 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by fonner Chief 
Judge Thomas Griesa 
46. 205 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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Batts. The district court dismissed the second action under the doctrine 
of claim preclusion and the circuit court affirmed.47 
B. Doctine Not Applied 
In Devlin v. Transportation Communications International ~ n i o n , ~ *  
the Second Circuit, speaking through former Chief Judge James Oakes, 
reversed the district court and held that plaintiffs claims under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA) should not be barred 
under the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion).49 Judge Oakes 
opined that the district court held that federal age discrimination related 
to the medical benefits "were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We 
disagree, and we vacate and remand."" Judge Oakes noted the district 
court's reliance on Woods v. Dunlop Tire  or^.^' and devoted a 
considerable portion of his opinion to distinguishing Woods from 
~ e v l i n . ' ~  Woods stands for the proposition that claim preclusion may be 
applied to prevent relitigation of a related claim not properly joined by a 
litigant. Judge Oakes held the district court should have considered 
consolidation of Devlin's claims prior to the application of res judicata. 
He stated: 
47. The district court had certified, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 3 1915(a), that any 
appeal from its order of dismissal would not be taken in good faith. Id. at 1332. See 
also Howard v. New York Times Co., 182 F.3d 899 (2d Cir. 1999) (precluding 
Plaintiffs Title VII claims by claim preclusion because they were resolved in an earlier 
action). Additional circuit court decisions applying claim preclusion have been decided. 
E.M.C. Mortgage Corp. v. Martin, 199 F.3d 1321 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding claim 
preclusion applicable to claims that could have been previously presented); L-Tec Elecs. 
Corp. v. Cougar Elec. Org., 198 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding claim preclusion 
applicable even if claims based upon different legal theories, provided they arise from 
the same transaction or occurrence); Rezzonico v. H. & R. Block, Inc., 182 F.3d 144 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (finding claim preclusion applies to both those matters actually offered to 
sustain the claim and those that might have been offered in the prior action); Zingher v. 
Vermont Div. of Vocational Rehab., 165 F.3d 1015 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding claim 
preclusion applicable to claims that could have been raised in earlier action). 
48. 175 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 1999). 
49. Retired employees brought an action alleging that their employer had violated 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act by terminating the company's death benefit fund and that constituted a 
violation of living adjustment for retirement benefits and violated several federal and 
state laws. Id. at 123. 
50. Id. at 128. 
5 1. 972 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1992). 
52. The plaintiff in Woods had waited more than three years to file her second 
claim which was barred by claim preclusion. Id. at 38. 
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We recognize that requiring a district judge to have a thorough familiarity 
with the facts and legal issues in every single case on a district court's docket 
is ludicrous given the heavy caseload district courts cany. In this case, 
however, both Devlin cases were on the court's active calendar such that we 
can conclude the district court could well have considered consolidating 
53 them. 
In Leather v. Ten ~ y c k , ' ~  the Second Circuit held plaintiffs civil 
rights action was not barred by claim preclusion or issue preclusion. 
The court, speaking through Judge Calabresi, held that the plaintiffs 
action was not barred by res judicata because his criminal conviction 
did not preclude an action for damages against the defendants." 
Similarly, in Flaherty v. the circuit court held that a student's 
claims that disciplinary proceedings against him were instituted in 
retaliation for his having exercised his rights under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution were not barred by claim preclusion or issue preclusion.57 
Finally, in United States Trust Co. v. ~enner," the circuit held that a 
judge's comments in litigation giving rise to settlement of the issue in 
interpleader actions, suggesting that only those bondholders who had 
purchased bonds before default date had a viable cause of action for 
securities fraud, did not have claim preclusion or issue preclusion effect 
in interpleader actions concerning distribution of settlement proceeds to 
investor~.'~ 
A. Doctrine Applied 
In Johnson v. ~rbitriurn,~' shareholders had brought suit seeking a 
declaratory judgment that they owned fifty-two percent of the 
outstanding shares of stock of the defendant-corporation. The 
complaint was dismissed by the United States District Court for the 
53. Devlin, 175 F.3d at 130. 
54. 180 F.3d 420 (2d Cir. 1999). 
55. Id. at 422. 
56. 199 F.3d 607 (2d Cir. 1999). 
57. Id. at 615. 
58. 168 F.3d 630 (2d Cir. 1999). 
59. Id. at 633. 
60. 198 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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District of Connecticut on issue preclusion grounds-the shareholders 
appealed. A divided circuit court held that a previous decision by the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, in an in rem proceeding, which 
determined that plaintiffs did not own a majority of shares, precluded 
them from obtaining a declaratory judgment to the contrary. The court 
also held that due process concerns did not prevent the operation of the 
doctrine of issue preclusion. District Court Judge Milton Shadur, sitting 
by designation on the circuit court, dissented on the grounds that the 
Delaware in rem proceeding did not constitute a binding determination 
of ownership as between the conflicting claimants to stock ownership 
because that issue determination was not necessary to the chancery 
court's final j~dgment.~ '  
In Buford v. ~ o o m b e , ~ '  the circuit court reminded the bench and bar 
that, under 28 U.S.C. 5 1738, a federal court must give to a state court 
judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given to the judgment 
under the law of the state in which the judgment was rendered. 
B. Doctrine Not Applied 
In an issue of first impression, the circuit court refused to apply 
offensive issue preclusion to sentencing findings in a subsequent civil 
proceeding. In Securities Exchange Commission v. Monarch Funding 
63 Corp., the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") moved for 
summary judgment on issue preclusion grounds based on findings of 
fact rendered by the court at a sentencing proceeding. The United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary 
judgment for the SEC and permanently enjoined the defendant from 
claiming future securities violations. The circuit court held that: (1) 
application of offensive issue preclusion to sentencing findings, in a 
subsequent civil proceeding, is not per se prohibited, but precluding 
relitigation on the basis of such findings should be presumed improper; 
and (2) application of issue preclusion to preclude the defendant from 
relitigating his liability for securities fraud, based on prior sentencing 
findings, was improper. This case is significant because the appellant 
had argued that sentencing findings should never be given preclusive 
effect in civil litigation. This contention was supported by various 
amici. The circuit court declined to adopt this sweeping per se 
61. Id. at 347. 
62. 199 F.3d 1321 (2d Cir. 1999). 
63. 192 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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prohibition. Judge Joseph McLaughlin set forth a four part test for use 
of the doctrine. First, the issues in both proceedings must be identical. 
Second, the issue in the prior proceeding must have been actually 
litigated and actually decided. Third, there must have been a full and 
fair opportunity for litigation in the prior proceeding. Fourth, the issue 
previously litigated must have been necessary to support a valid and 
final judgment on the merits. Judge McLaughlin then explained: 
First, a plenary civil trial affords a defendant procedural opportunities that are 
unavailable at sentencing and that could command a different result. . . . 
Second, the incentive to litigate a sentencing finding is frequently less intense, 
and certainly more fraught with risk, than it would be for a full-blown civil 
trial. . . . Finally, a defendant, though uniquely knowledgeable about that 
64 
underlying events, may be reluctant to testify during sentencing. 
In United States v. ~ u s s e i n , ~ ~  the circuit court again adopted and 
explained the four-part test for application of issue preclusion. The 
court refused to apply the doctrine because the issue in the prior 
proceeding was not actually decided. The court stated: 
The rationale for the principle that preclusive effect will be given only to those 
findings that are necessary to a prior judgment is that a collateral issue, 
although it may be the subject of a finding, is less likely to receive close 
judicial attention and the parties may well have only limited incentive to 
66 litigate the issue fully since it is not determinative. 
The court's conclusion that issue preclusion will not be given to 
alternative findings of fact is not the law in the State of New ~ o r k . ~ '  
Hence, in federal diversity cases, district courts may sometimes apply 
the doctrine to fact finding that was not necessary to a prior judgment. 
IV. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
68 In National Labor Relations Board v. Thalbo Corp., the circuit 
court recognized a "special considerations" rule that may counsel 
against application of claim preclusion or issue preclusion against a 
government agency seeking to enforce federal law. Also, in Morris v. 
64. Id. at 305. 
65. 178 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1999). 
66. Id. at 129 (quoting Commercial Assocs. v. Tilcon Grammino, Inc., 998 F.2d 
1092, 1097 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
67. See Malloy v. Trombly, 50 N.Y.2d 46,51,405 N.E.2d 213,215-16 (1980). 
68. 171 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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~indau,~'  the court explained when a settlement agreement should be 
given res judicata effect. In Morris, a police chief and his son brought 
civil rights actions against a town and its officials, claiming that 
retaliatory acts had been committed in response to the police chief's 
speech. The chief claimed he was constructively demoted in retaliation 
for exercising his First Amendment rights. The claim was based on 
amendments to town procedures substituting a town supervisor for the 
police chief. These amendments occurred in a resolution deemed to be 
part of a settlement agreement resolving a prior civil rights lawsuit by 
the chief and, thus, were given claim preclusive effect. 
During the survey year, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit issued numerous unpublished summary orders," each stating: 
69. 196 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1999). 
70. Antonelli v. United States, No. 98-2972, 2000 WL 31 1066 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 
2000); Richard Feiner & Co. v. H.R. Indust., No. 98-9390, 1999 WL 385763 (2d Cir. 
June 4, 1999); United States v. Walker, No. 98-1591, 1999 WL 385758 (2d Cir. June 4, 
1999); Young v. Coughlin, No. 98-3717, 1999 WL 385757 (2d Cir. June 4, 1999); 
Packard v. United States, No. 98-6223, 1999 WL 500797 (2d Cir. June 1, 1999); Clark 
v. Mercado, No. 98-7934, 1999 WL 373889 (2d Cir. May 28, 1999); Ortiz v. Coughlin, 
No. 97-2588, 1999 WL 197191 (2d Cir. Apr. 1, 1999); United States v. Ahmad, No. 98- 
1480, 1999 WL 197190 (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 1999); United States v. Luisi, No. 98-1616, 
1999 WL 197218 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1999); United States v. Arce, No. 98-1279, 1999 
WL 197215 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1999); United States v. Tavarez, No. 94-1575, 1999 WL 
197214 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1999); Butts v. City of New York Dept. of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 
No. 98-7209, 1999 WL 187912 (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 1999); United States v. Rosier, No. 98- 
1485, 1999 WL 197217 (2d Cir. Mar. 24, 1999); United States v. Palacios, Nos. 98- 
1458,98-1459, 1999 WL 197216 (2d Cir. Mar. 24, 1999); Loli v. Citibank, Inc., No. 98- 
7219, 1999 WL 187913 (2d Cir. Mar. 24, 1999); Rivers v. Comm., No. 98-4042, 1999 
WL 197219 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 1999); Habiniak v. Renssalaer City Mun. Corp., No. 98- 
7817, 1999 WL 164950 (2d Cir. Mar. 22, 1999); United States v. Blackwell., Nos. 97- 
1143(L), 97-1242(CON), 97-1 144(CON), 97-1 173(CON), 1999 WL 163980 (2d Cir. 
Mar. 18, 1999); Best v. Miller, No. 98-7677, 1999 WL 147050 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 1999); 
McAllan v. Malatzky, No. 98-7218, 1999 WL 146300 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 1999); 
Labensky v. Rozzi, No. 98-7512, 1999 WL 146292 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 1999); Wells v. 
New York City Dept. of Corr., No. 98-2039, 1999 WL 132176 (2d Cir. Mar. 11, 1999); 
United States v. Fulton, No. 97-1681, 1999 WL 132172 (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 1999); Reyes- 
Aponte v. City of New York Dept. of Corr., No. 98-7672, 1999 WL 132182 (2d Cir. 
Mar. 8, 1999); Then v. United States, No. 97-2867, 1999 WL 132234 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 
1999); Geathers v. Morgenthau, No. 97-2640, 1999 WL 132233 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); 
United States v. Gibson, No. 98-1334, 1999 WL 132232 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); United 
States v. Frierson, No. 98-1 185, 1999 WL 132231 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); United States 
v. Burgos, No. 98-1174, 1999 WL 132230 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); United States v. 
Ardakian, No. 98-1359, 1999 WL 132228 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); Albert v. Strack, No. 
98-2350, 1999 WL 132226 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); Ige v. United States, No. 98-2419, 
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20001 RES JUDICATA DEVELOPMENTS 
THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE 
FEDERAL REPORTER AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL 
AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT, BUT MAY BE 
CALLED TO THE AlTENTION OF THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT IN A 
SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN 
ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES 
JUDICATA. 
These summary orders involve pro se complaints filed by plaintiffs 
in the circuit's federal district courts. They are generally unknown to 
the practicing bar. The intent of the orders are to prevent pro se parties 
from relitigating claims that could have been brought in a prior action 
and from relitigating issue determinations necessary to a final judgment 
in a different cause of action previously litigated in the circuit. 
The circuit's summary order procedure is arguably unfair to pro se 
litigants who should not be expected to understand res judicata 
1999 WL 132217 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); Gyadu v. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, No. 98- 
7638, 1999 WL 132213 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); Moskowitz v. Hammons, No. 98-7664, 
1999 WL 13221 2 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1999); Bumpus v. Warden, No. 98-2406, 1999 WL 
132218 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1999); Suzio Concrete Co., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 
No. 98-4106, 98-4136, 1999 WL 132216 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1999); Turk v. Turk, No. 98- 
5025, 1999 WL 130204 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1999); Capton v. City of Niagara Falls, Nos. 
98-7018, 98-7072, 1999 WL 130202 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1999); Ibrahim v. New York State 
Dept. of Health, No. 98-7709, 1999 WL 128863 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 1999); Hanley v. 
Deluxe Caterers of Shelter Rock, Inc., Nos. 98-7586 L, 98-7716, 1999 WL 130669 (2d 
Cir. Mar. 3, 1999); Nationwide Mut. Fire Insur. Co. v. Coolidge, No. 98-7654, 1999 WL 
130189 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 1999); United States v. Piggott, No. 97-1715, 1999 WL 110423 
(2d Cir. Mar. 1, 1999); Wynn v. Nationwide Insur. Co., No. 98-5003, 1999 WL 106218 
(2d Cir. Feb. 26, 1999); Constantinescu v. Dentsply Equip., No. 98-7543, 1999 WL 
106217 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 1999); Summer Communications, Inc. v. Three A's Holding, 
LLC, No. 97-9095, 1999 WL 106216 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 1999); States v. Beckerman, No. 
98-6195, 1999 WL 97237 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1999); Kulniszewski v. Swist, No. 98-7487, 
1999 WL 97362 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 1999); United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, No. 98-6074, 1999 WL 
97236 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1999); Johnson v. St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Ctr., No. 98-7831, 
1999 WL 97232 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1999); Howard v. Pierce, No. 97-2854, 1999 WL 
97239 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 1999); Demeritt v. Town of Brunswick, No. 98-7509, 1999 WL 
97238 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 1999); Grandi v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 97-9309, 
1999 WL 96128 (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 1999); United States v. Castillo, No. 98-1 172, 1998 
WL 995131 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1999); Davis v. United States, No. 97-2265, 1999 WL 
96144 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1999); Dean v. Abrams, No. 97-7462, 1999 WL 96140 (2d Cir. 
Feb. 18, 1999); Manners v. New York, No. 97-9424, 1999 WL 96136 (2d Cir. Feb. 18, 
1999); United States v. Terdik, No. 98-1321, 1998 WL 995130 (2d Cir. Feb. 17, 1999); 
United States v. Bartels, No. 98-1347, 1999 WL 96137 (2d Cir. Feb. 17, 1999); Big 
Bros. Sportswear, Inc. v. Third Rail, Inc., No. 97-9507, 1998 WL 995129 (2d Cir. Feb. 
17, 1999); Rankel v. Acrish, No. 98-7281, 1999 WL 65137 (2d Cir. Feb. 8, 1999); 
Salten v. Nat'l Trans. Safety Bd., No. 98-4123, 1999 WL 48781 (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 1999); 
Marel v. Lord, No. 98-2453, 1999 WL 126685 (2d Cir. Jan. 21, 1999). 
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principles. Fairness is a fundamental societal goal of res judicata. 
Principles of finality may be important for conservation of judicial 
resources in the circuit but, at the very least, pro se litigants should be 
alerted as to how the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion 
can be used against them. Summary orders should not be issued unless 
the record shows the litigant was given "notice" of the res judicata 
implications of his or her case prior to the proceeding and judgment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Crowded court dockets in the circuit and the increase of civil 
rights, Title VII, and employment termination cases, along with pro se 
filings should result in the expanded use of claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion during the 2000-2001 Survey Year. 
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